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FIGHTINGS AROUND
SHANGHAI

FOREWORD
This is the first reliable account in English, so
far published, of the recent military operations
around Shanghai. It has been compiled from official
data kindly furnished by the Press Section of the
War Office. While heartily deploring the terrible
loss of life and the unspeakable sufferings of body
and soul which the clash of arms has necessarily
entailed, one fortunately finds in the story of the
campaili!n some features that call forth feelings
of more pleasing character.
Speaking, for instance, from a national point
of view, we may say, without any intention of
boasting, that our heart glows with pride and
thankfulness to see from incontestable evidence
that our people have not lost their traditional traits
of heroic bravery and self-sacrificing patriotism
which have made Japan what she is now among
the great nations of the world.
Nor are we less willing to bear witness to the
great power of resistance and fine esprit de corps
so abundantly shown by the Chinese forces pitted
against ours. Without meaning any discourtesy to
our continental neighbours, we may say this was a
revelation not to ourselves alone but to the whole
world. It has shown once more-for this is by no
means the first time the world has had the chance
to learn the same lesson-that the Chinese, contrary
to a generally accepted theory in recent years, are
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far from deficient in qualities needed for the make
up of the first class soldiers. It is only training
and organization that will be required for making
them into a formidable military power.
We are pleased to pay this homage to the
Chinese people, because we are convinced that the
emergence of a sufficiently large army composed
of strong men like those led by General Tsai Tingkai, is one of the essential conditions for the
unification of China.
There is another reason why we are pleased
with the unexpected display of courage and strength
by the Chinese. It is almost a truism to say that
there can be no true and lasting friendship unless
it rests upon the rock of mutual respect. This is
true of nations even more than of individuals.
The prospect of a strong and well-armed China
will necessarily give rise to reflections of a decidedly
disquieting tenor. But after taking all things into
consideration, we are persuaded to believe that a
stronger and more self-reliant China will conduce
to the establishment of happier and more endurable
relations between her and Japan.
But all these considerations apart, we owe it
to ourselves and to the sense of fairness to offer
China our unstinted recognition of the good account
her fighters have given of themselves at Shanghai.
MOTOSADA ZUMOTO

Tokyo, May, 1932.

FIGHTINGS AROUND
SHANGHAI

I. The Start of the Military Expedition
The Imperial naval force, which was landed
at Shanghai upon the outbreak of the trouble there,
to protect some 30,000 Japanese residents and their
property, was to find itself confronted by a Chinese
army numbering more than ten times as large as
itself. Our naval men, in their continuous struggle
against such tremendous odds, had to fight under
extremely trying conditions, day and night, with
little rest or sleep. Inspite of such efforts, however,
the situation in Shanghai went from bad to worse,
plunging our resident population into a state of
unbearable uncertainty and danger. But there being
a limit to the number to be drawn upon the Navy
for service ashore, the Government decided early
in February to despatch, with Imperial sanction, a
military force to Shanghai to assure the safety of
our residents there and also to perform our international duties of guarding the Settlement.
There was organized an expeditionary army
with the Ninth Division as its main body. In addition a mixed brigade was despatched from the
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Twelfth Division. The latter force, for the time
being placed under the Commander of the Third
Squadrop later to be put under the Commander of
the Ninth Division upon his landing in Shanghai,
boarded vessels of the Second Squadron and left
Sasebo at 11 a.m. on February 6. In the following
afternoon these men began to make a landing at a
point some 3,000 kilometres south of Woosungchen.
Towards 5.30 p.m. the first-line troops were advanced
on the southern side of Woosungchen to face across
the creek a hostile force garrisoning the Woosung
forts, while our main force was concentrated near
the railway station. After a survey of the field,
it was decided for tactical reasons to suspend tbe
offensive movement for the time being, and keep a
watch on the opposing line.
The Ninth Division began to board ships at
Ujina on February 9. The first portion, under cover
of the bombardment made by the convoying ships
for restraining the forts, proceeded past Woosung
in the evening of February 13. A portion of these
troops was taken to the railway wharf south of
Woosungchen, while the main body was brought
up to the wharf in Shanghai.
First Statement by Commander of the Ninth Division

Lieutenant-General Uyeda, Commander of the
Ninth Division, upon his arrival at Shanghai, issued
prior to :his landing a statement which rendered
into English reads as follows :
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"I have this day arrived here charged with the
duties of safeguarding the subjects of our Empire
resident in and about Shanghai. The provocative
Chinese attitude toward our landing party has placed
the Settlement in a state of danger and uncertainty.
Our nationals are now subject to extremely trying
conditions of life. In directing the action of the
Division under my command, I intend to cooperate
with our Navy and save our nationals from their
present difficulty with the least delay. While it is
our aim to attain our object as peacefully as
possible, any interference with the action of our
Division will be disposed of promptly and with
decision. With regard to the Powers with which
we are to work, we shall aim at a friendly co·
operation in our efforts to rescue the Settlement
from the present menaces. As for the general
populace of China who will offer no interference
with our Division or its performance of duties, we
are ready, being aware of their difficulty well
deserving of sympathy, to show full regard for the
peaceful tenor of their lives."
The Ninth Division began to land its first
contingent at 7 a.m. on February 14. A part of
these troops was stationed at a Chinese village
about 6 kilometres east of Kiangwanchen, while the
main body was quartered in the Japanese factories
in Yangshupu, an eastern section of the International
Settlement. On the following day, February 15, a
portion of its forces, replacing the landing party,
took over the guard of North Szechuan Road. The
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second contingent, arriving a
morning of February 16, comp
same day.

the wharf in th-..
~~ed it lanJing the

II. What was Done to A vert Hostilities
The Ninth Division thus completed its concentration near Shanghai by February 16; but being
still hopeful of an amicable settlement, the Commander caused his Chief of Staff to arrange an
interview with the Chief of Staff of the ineteenth
Route Army. At this meeting our advice was
offered as to possible means of effecting a peaceful
settlement. The conference, however, disclo ed a
wide divergence of views, and our sugg tions,
which were offered in a spirit of fairness, failed to
win a favourable response. The Commander of the
Ninth Division, still reluctant to forego his hope of
settling the si uation by means other than arm ,
addressed on F bruary 18 at 9 p.m. a note to the
Commander of the ineteenth Route Army, asl ing
for his reconsideration.

General Uyeda's Note to the Commander of
Nineteenth Route Army

The Note which Lieutenant-General Uyeda addre sed on the same occasion was to the following
effect:
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" Being most earnestly desirous of performing
by peaceful mea ns the du t ies I am charged with, I
wish to submit the following with the hope that it
may meet with your favourable consideration :
" (1) You will at once cease hostilities, completing the evacuation of your first line by 7 a.m. in
the mornin g of February 20. Your army will then
withdraw by 5 p.m. in the afternoon of February 20
to areas, excluding the Lion Hill Forts and 20 kilometres from the boundary line of the International
Settlement as follows: in the area lying on the west
side of the Whangpoo, to the northward of the line to
be drawn from T saochiatuchen at the northwestern
point of the Internation al Settlement to Chouchiachiaochen and Pusungchen ; and in the area lying on
the east side of the Whangpoo River, to the northward
of the line from Lannitu to Chan gchialouchen, a line
largely running through the heart of Shanghai from
east to west. The forts and other military works
within the designated ar as should be removed not
to be replaced by new preparations.
" (2) The Japanese army will make no shooting, bombing, or movement in pursuit, excepting reconnoitring by aeroplane, after your army have
begun to withdraw. Upon evacuation of your army
the Japanese army will confine itself to the maintenance in Honiikew of the area about the street on
which the Municipal Cou:1cil building is placed,
including the locality round Hongkew Park.
" (3) Upon the complete withdrawal of your
first-line troops, the Japanese army will despatch

under armed guard a committee of investigation to
go over the evacuated area. The same committee
will carry the Japanese national flag for identification.
"(4) Your army will offer full protection to the
lives and property of Japanese nationals resident near
Shanghai outside the above areas of evacuation. In
case such protection should fail, the Japanese army
will take such measures as may be considered proper. Your army will also put an effective stop to
all activities of the plain-clothes soldiers.
" (5) As for the protection of foreign residents,
other than Japanese, around Shanghai, including the
above areas of evacuation, negotiation shall be made
on some future occasion.
" (6) With regard to the suppression of antiJapanese activities, the pledge given by Mayor Wu
to Consul-General Murai on January 28 must be
strictly put into effect.
" On this point the Japanese diplomatic officials
will approach your civil authorities in Shanghai for
separate negotiation.
" In case the foregoing points fail to be carried
out, the Japanese army will be obliged to take free
action against your army which should hold itself
responsible for whatever consequences."

Commaoder of the Nineteenth Route Army Repliea

Replying to the above note, General Tsai Tingkai, Commander of the Nineteenth Route Army, sent

a note at 8.15 p.m. on February 19, which ran 1n
substance as below :
" We beg to acknowledge receipt of your note
despatched at 9 p.m. on February 18. Our army,
being responsible directly to the National Govern·
ment, holds itself subject only to its order. We
have reported the points contained in your communication to the National Government which, we
trust, will transmit its reply directly to your Minister
through the Foreign Department. While I am as
yet in receipt of no official instruction, the National
Government, according to Rengo news, has instructed Commander Tsai and Mayor Wu to reply to you
to the following effect :
" (1) The Chinese army will withdraw to 20
kilometres from the boundary line of the International Settlement :
." (2) The Japanese army will likewise withdraw
20 kilometres :
" (3) As regards the permanent disarmament
of the forts at Woosung and Paoshan, we refuse to
comply with the Japanese proposal."
In such circumstances the Commander of the
Ninth Division was obliged to conclude that the
Chinese had no intention of agreeing to his proposal, and decided to follow the only course now
open to him.
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III. Topographical Features of Shanghai
Region and Conditions of the
Enemy's Forces
T opographical Features
The country round Shanghai, which is a level
plain made of the sandy mud carried down by the
Yangtze, forms a veritable canal zone with Kiangwan Canal, Woosung Creek, Whangpoo River and
hundreds of other creeks running in all directions
between lakes and rivers. There are great facilities
for water transport ; but as for land traffic and especially roads over any speakable distance, there
are absolutely no paths except those made along
the wider creeks or canals used by men towing
boats. The minor creeks are spanned at places by
bridges hardly negotiable by anything heavier than
cattle. Besides, these waterways are such that
soldiers could never wade through by foot, and,
therefore, form very serious obstacles to movement
of organized forces. Military operations under such
conditions were by necessity hampered to a very
serious degree.
What is more, the towns in the neighbourhood
of Shanghai are encircled by heavy brick walls
which proved not only unclimbable but even formed
effective barricades against field artillery fire. Smaller
villages, though without such walls as a rule, are
in many instances girdled by waterways. These
villages generally have no defence work to guard
the whole communal areas, but there are walls built
(A)
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by family groups which live closely together behind
them for self-protection. These walls offered considerable facilities for resisting the offensive fire.
(B)

Conditions of the Enemy Forces

The Chinese force which the Ninth Division
upon its landing had to face at the front was the
Nineteenth Route Army, commanded by T sai Tingkai, which roughly consisted of the following :Soldiers and arms

60th Div.

6lst Div.

78th Div.

Total

Number of soldiers

11,000

12,500

10,000

33,500

Number of rifles

9,000

10,500

8,000

27,500

24

28

20

72

8

10

6

24

10

20

10

40

Machine guns
Mountain artillery
Trench mortars

No~ :-Each Division consists of 6

Tuan, one Tuan corresponding

to one Japanese regiment.

It may also be noted that the main forces of
the Guard Divisions at Nanking and Hangchow
were at the time still placed at Sungkiang, Nanhsiang,
Kunshan and also westward of these places. The
dispositions of these troops were as shown in
Chart I.
With regard to these enemy positions, further
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details mentioned below were learned as a result of
open hostilities.
The construction of the enemy's positions near
Shanghai had been started before February 12. It
was apparently planned from the start that Kiangwanchen and Miaohsiangchen should form the first
line of defence. The Chinese positions at the former
town and northward were each constructed strongly
with a village as its basis and effectively guarded
on the flanks by a series of strong emplacements
for machine guns. These preparations may further
be described as follows :
(1) Shelter Trenches
These trenches consisted of standing fire trenches
with traverses and also of double bottomed trenches
which were not of uniform strength. As a rule the
trenches were narrow but fairly deep, occasionally
lightly sheltered by wooden boards or panels, and
iron sheets.
(2) Covered Machine Gun Emplacements ·
The machine gun emplacements were generally
covered. The protective covers were fairly strongly
built with thin iron sheets and brick. The mounds
or Chinese graves, wherever found, were utilized for
defensive purposes. Concrete and brick buildings
were seldom overlooked, not a few of them being
provided with loopholes.
(3) Outer Trenches ·
The outer trenches before the enemy's positions
generally seemed to ha 'le been made by utilizing
waterways. At some points d'appui there were
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formed special outer trenches 4 metres wide at the
top and 2 metres deep.
(4) Barricades, etc.
Points d'appui were invariably guarded by light
wire entanglements made by use of standing trees,
wooden beams of houses and so forth joined by a
network of barbed wire. These were mostly built to
a depth of about 4 metres, some of them being
movable. Palisades were also seen at some places.
(5) Armour-Sheltered Positions
As for positions protected by armour, there was
nothing specially noteworthy except those with light
protective covers of iron for use of commanding
officers.
'•

IV. Offensive about Kiangwanchen
(See Accompanying Chari)
What should particularly be noted about the
present operations is that the Japanese army, in the
first place, openly set the date for commencement
of its general offensive, thus sacrificing tactical ad·
vantages, and, in the second, it directed its action
by only frontal attacks. These tactical moves were
deliberately chosen, despite the obvious disadvan·
tages, in consideration of serious eventualities other·
wise likely to involve the other Powers in Shanghai.
If, for instance, attack was made on the enemy's
ftank from the north, his force might have fallen
back in disorder into the International Settlement
to imperil the civilian population there.
Opera·
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tions from the southern side were likewise out of
the question because of the existence of the French
Concession. The Japanese forces in the circumstances
were obliged to fight under the worst given conditions.

(A)

Fighting on February 20

At 7 a.m. on February 20 the Chinese first line
showed no signs of withdrawal, but even displayed
their hostile disposition by firing upon our aeroplanes. Nor had the National Government sent its
reply. The Ninth Division, therefore, launched its
offensive action at 7.30 a.m. with its troops disposed
as below:
The Woosung Detachment (two infantry companies as unit).
Placed south of W oosungchen ; this detachment covered the rear of the right flank of
the Division.
The Mixed Brigade (less the Woosung Detach·
ment).
By advancing through the area southwest
of Woosung, this brigade directed its action
againt the enemy's positions northwest of
Kiangwanchen.
The Right Column (6 infantry battalions and
one battalion of mountain artillery as unit).
This column attacked the enemy about
Kiangwanchen from the east side.
The Central Column (approximately 4 battalions
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of infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery
as unit).
This force attacked the enemy to the south
of Kiangwanchen.
The Left Column (the landing party as unit).
These troops held their positions in Chapei,
keeping watch over the opposing front.
Field Artillery and Aerial Force.
In the earlier stages of fighting these forces
chiefly cooperated with the Right Column.
The Third Naval Squadron at the same time cooperated with the Ninth Division in support of the
Woosung Detachment by bombardment of certain
strategic points and manoeuvring in the direction
of Liuhochen.
Our first-line troops continued to move forward
at each point, by driving off small enemy forces on
their way, until they reached at 10 a.m. the line
from north to south of the Kiangwan race course.
Then our Right Column routed the enemy force, two
to three thousand strong, occupying the strong r.ositions along a line from north to south of the eastern
side of Kiangwanche~. A portion of this column
entered the same town at 1 p.m.
Toward the evening the Mixed Brigade in the
right wing advanced to the northwest of Kiangwanchen, reaching the line of Peisungchai, Chinfengchai,
and Maochiachai. The main body of our Division
had in the meantime moved eastward from the areas
north of Kiangwanchen along the railway line, until
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it advanced to a line on the east side of Fangpin,
1 kilometre south of Kiangwan.
By midnight of the same day it had been learned that the enemy's first line occupied the fortified
positions on a line extending from near Miaohsiang
to the neighbourhood of the North Station, Shanghai, across the creeks on the west side of Kiangwanchen. A hostile force placed in the centre of
Kiangwanchen was still offering stubborn resistance. There was a massed force of Chinese in the
neighbourhood of Tachangchen. The areas about
Woosungchen were still held by the enemy. It was
also learned that the enemy's second line of positions was placed along a line from north to south
touching at the east end of Tachangchen, while his
third line, close behind, on a north to south line
running at the western end of the same town. In
the light of such knowledge the Commander of the
Division transferred the main body of the Central
Column to the area between the Right Column and
the Mixed Brigade, in preparation for the operations
of next day. He also made the following changes
in dispositions of our forces:The Woosung Detachment.
This was to continue its duties as before.
The 24th Mixed Brigade.
Prepared for the offensive against the enemy
force in front.
The Right Column (approximately 3 battalions
of infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery
as unit).
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This body prepared for its offensive by
advancing to a line extending southward
from Paiyangtsun to Sunchiachai and beyond.
The Left Column (approximately 6 battalions of
infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery as
unit).
Prepared for the offensive against the
enemy at Kiangwanchen and northward.
One Infantry Battalion.
Prepared for the offensive against the
enemy south of Kiangwanchen.
The Main Force of Field Artillery.
This was placed near the Kiangwan Race
Course chiefly to act in cooperation with
the Right Column.
The Landing Party.
Was to guard its present positions.
The Reserve Force (approximately 2 battalions
of infantry).
This was stationed on the east side of the
Kiangwan Race Course.

(B)

Fighting on February 21.
At 8 a.m. on February 21 our Division opened
action with artillery fire, to be followed by assaults
on the enemy at Kiangwanchen.
About 9.30 a.m. the enemy forces in the centre
of Kiangwanchen began to show signs of wavering
under our fire. A part of our Left Column was
then charged with the task of clearing the enemy
from the streets, while the rest advanced on two
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sides of the streets, moving forward along a north
to south line at the western end of the town.
In the evening of February 21 the enemy
firmly held their ground from near Chichialiu,
about 6 kilometres northward from the west end of
Kiangwanchen, to the eastern ends of Siwan and
Miaohsiang, and southwardly, to the villages along
a small creek running from north to south at
the western extremity of Kiangwanchen. Our first
line closely pressed against these positions.
I

Fighting on February 22
At daybreak our Division started operations
against the enemy's positions north of Kiangwanchen. At 6.40 a.m. or thereabout the 24th Mixed
Brigade captured the hostile positions in the neighbourhood of Miaohsiang; and later, broke through
the opposing line extending northward from Howkuochiachai, about 600 metres north of the western
end of Kiangwanchen. But what with a number
of plain-clothes soldiers now overriding the field of
battle, demanding our serious attention, and a series
of creeks and narrow paths impeding our progress,
considerable difficulty was experienced in employing
our troops to full advantage. Our progress for the
day was as far as the lines described below, a portion of our troops being posted in Kiangwan and
southwestward to keep a watch over the enemy's
positions.
Main Body of the 24th Mixed Brigade : near
the western point of Miaohsiang.
(C)
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Right Column: at the western end of Maochiachai and Pusi.
Left Column: near Shouchiashe and Shunchiachai.
Main Force of Mountain Artillery: near Liangyinchai north of Kiangwanchen.
Main Force of Field and Heavy Artillery : near
Kiangwan Race Course.
The defeated enemy soldiers stopped in the
villages close before our line.
As a result of the day's engagements near
Miaohsiang, it was definitely ascertained that
the 18th Guard Division under Chiang Kaishek had joined the Chinese first-line.
At midnight on February 22 an enemy force of
about 3 battalions made an assault on the rear of
the right flank of our 24th Mixed Brigade at Nan·
sunchai and eastward. The assailants, however,
were repulsed with heavy damage. The same night
also saw a series of counter-attacks north of Chapei
and bombardments by Chinese artillery, which were
in each case overcome.
It was also in the course of this day's fighting
that three Japanese privates met with their end in
a manner that was to be acclaimed by the whole
nation as mirroring national heroism of the highest
order. Below is a brief account of the same incident.
The enemy's positions about Miaohsiang were
well protected as the mainstay of his left wing.
No less than a score of days must have been spent
on their preparation. Protected by a system of
barbed wire and outer trenches, they really presented
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propositions of considerable difficulty. Besides, the
wire entanglements happened to have escaped the
punishment of our artillery fire. It became neces·
sary in the circumstances that our engineers should
undertake to open up paths through these areas of
wire entanglements for the charge of infantry men
which was set for an early morning hour of February 22. It was therefore planned to accomplish
it by improvising for the purpose long explosive
tubes, on which work was started in the evening
of February 21.
A small squad of engineers, to whom the task
of breaking down the wire entanglements had been
given, made arrangements with the infantry troops
which were to charge through the opened paths.
These engineers then betook themselves close to
their objective points about 5 a.m. and waited for
the appointed time. In early hours of the seventeenth
day of the lunar month, the moon was still out,
though more often veiled by morning mists. So
they could command a view to a distance of not
more than 30 or so metres ahead.
The explosive squad under Sergeant Umada
was divided into three parties each of three men.
Intending to complete their work of destruction in
.the dark, they put up a smoke screen under cover
of which they crawled on. But they had not approached within 30 or so metres from their objective
when their presence was discovered. A heavy
fusillade was poured upon them. But our m,en
hurled themselves forward in their resolute attempt.
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They were all killed or disabled. Whereupon the
task of destruction fell upon the second squad under
Corporal Uchida which had been holding itself in
reserve. Private Sakue's first party and Private
Kitamura's second party each prepared for their
duties. It was plain that the enemy, now well on
their guard, would give them no time to ignite the
explosive after placing it in the entanglement.
These men, therefore, decided to drive the explosive
home in a way which, counting all chances of
success in their favour, still meant their own
destruction as sure as that of the entanglements.
Having ignited the fuse, they carried the heavy
explosive tube between them and ran for the wire
entanglement. The second party of Private Kitamura managed to withdraw itself to some distance
in time. The first party of Private Sakue and two
others, however, with no thought of withdrawal,
carried on their duties until their end. Corporal
Uchida in command was also wounded. Thus there
were opened up two passages, each about 10 metres
wide. Sergeant Umada, in command of the first
squad, who had sent his three parties with unsuccessful results, now leaped forth and hurled more
than a dozen of hand grenades upon the enemy
line. In the moments of confusion thus created he
rushed single-handed into the wire defence and cut
open a passage by means of hand shears. Three
pathways thus having been made, the infantry
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charged through to capture a sector of the Miaohsiang line.
(D) Fighting on February 23-24 (Chart

m

A tactical change was now thought advisadle in
the light of the experience gained during the past
few days. The enemy, in fortifying their positions,
seemed to have overlooked no creek, village or
dwelling house of any strategic value. At each
important point a barricade of one sort or another
had been put up. In consideration of these points
and also our numerical strength put into play, the
Ninth Division decided to drop the idea of making
operations on the general line at the same time.
They decided on a new line of tactics in which our
bombardment, especially from the air and by heavy
artillery, after full preparation on well elaborated
schemes, was to be concentrated on the enemy's
strategic points one after another until a complete
destruction should be wrought all along and the
field opened up for more extensive and freer
operations. On the two days February 23- 24 our
troops generally remained at their positions of the
previous night, making preparations for the proposed
offensive.
The enemy, however, made around sunset on
February 23 counter attacks against the front of
our Mixed Brigade and the front of our Left Column.
About 8.30 p.m. they attacked the neighbourhood
of the radio station of the Divisional Headquarters.
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These sectional counter-attacks were repulsed in
each instance.
From the information in hand from various
sources, it was gathered that the enemy's positions
at this stage were roughly as shown in Chart II.
Fighting from February 25 to 29
On February 25 our Division launched the
second general offensive. The 24th Mixed Brigade
was charged to maintain the captured positions
about Miaohsiangchen. The Right Column was the
first to start action, opening the fire at 6.30 a.m. by
heavy artillery and from the air, concentrating it
upon the enemy line in front. At 10 a.m. these
forces captured the hostile positions to the north
and south of Chinchiachiang. By this time the
enemy line to our south or to the southwest of
Kiangwanchen, began to waver with some numbers
already in retreat to the west. Our Division then
had its artillery fire concentrated upon the enemy
in and about Howkuochiachai and Tsienkuochiachai
in front of our Left Column, which had by 4 p.m.
completely captured the enemy's positions in these
areas.
The routed enemy ranks were being concentrated
at Erhshihsanyuan, a point about 2 kilometres
northwest of Kiangwan, when a force of Inspecting
Soldiers or "shock troops in the rear," who are
charged to encourage or punish the soldiers of
their own side in retreat, happened to appear on
the scene on their eastern advance. These two
(E)
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groups had an armed clash the while our aeroplanes
and artillery went on to inflict heavy damage upon
them. However, the ruthless barrier set up by the
Shock Troops in the rear at least had the effect of
causing the routed soldiers to heel about and advance
eastward for the recovery of their lost positions.
These men reappeared before the villages now in
our hands. But almost completely demoralized, they
were no longer capable of brisk action. Of the
enemy force, too, which had been offering a stubborn
resistance from within Kianwanchen, some began to
retaeat toward 4 p.m.
On the other hand, fresh enemy troops began
to move forward about noon from two directions,
one from the west, and the other from Lotienchen,
both proceeding towards Tachangchen.
During the offensive of this day the Navy ac·
corded very effective aid. Cooperation between our
infantry and artillery likewise being effected to
satisfaction, our .men succeeded in wresting all of
the objective positions from the enemy. Though
we were unable to develop our fighting capacity to
the full for numerical and topographical reasons,
our army this day inflicted on the hostile line damage
of serious material and moral significance.'
On the following day, February 26, at 6.20 a.m.,
a company under Sub-Lieutenant Wakabayashi, of
the Seventh Infantry Regiment, made a surprise
attack at Yenchiachia, on the northwest side of
Kiangwan. By an adroit movement at a dead angle
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of their arms, these men succeeded in 'capturing the
Chinese position, guarded by four machine guns.
At 2.10 p.m. on February 27 our Division occupied the western end of Kiangwanchen, thus
taking the whole enemy line extending from Miaohsiangchen to the western end of Kiangwanchen.
Our work was now to be directed to preparation
for the offensive against the enemy's second line
near Tachangchen.

· V. Our Army Reinforced
At the time of despatching the Ninth Division
to Shanghai there was no knowing as to the
attitude of Chinese troops other than the Nineteenth
Route Army. It was not until February 22 that it
was ascertained as a result of engagements that
the enemy's ranks had considerably been swelled
by addition of the Guard Divisions under Chiang
Kai-shek. Now taking into reckoning the topographical elements to be overcome and the numerical
strength of our side, the existing situation suggested
possibilities of our Division coming to a deadlock on
the field of battle. A speedy reinforcement was
plainly necessary in order to dispose of the Chinese
opposition for an early settlement of the situation.
It was therefore arranged to form an expeditionary
army in the Shanghai region by addition of the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Divisions, together with
some special forces from elsewhere.
General
Yoshinori Shirakawa was placed in command of
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this army. The transportation of these reinforcements was prepared with the least possible delay.
The Commander of the expeditionary army,
accompanied by his staff, sailed from the home
waters on February 27. Arriving at the mouth of
the Yangtze on February 29, he effected arrangements for the Naval cooperation for the landing of
the troops. The Commander, taking all the circumstances into consideration, deemed delay impermissible. A general ' offensive was set for the next day,
March 1, and instructions were issued accordingly.
The Ninth Division was ordered to advance, according to its prearranged plans, to a line from near
Changchiachiao, west of Miaohsiangchen, to Hsimawan about 2 kilometres to the south of Kiangwanchen via Tahsingchiao, some 2 kilometres west of
Kiangwanchen. The main body of the Eleventh
Division, freshly arriving, was to make a landing
early in the morning of March 1 on the shore of
the Yangtze in a northwesterly direction of Liuhochen, with the instruction to take possession of the
last named place with the least possible delay so
as to be in readiness for later offensive moves on
Tachangan and Chenju.
General Shirakawa, the Commander, landing at
Shanghai at 1 p.m. on March 1, at once issued a
statement.
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Commander Shirakawa's Statement

"I have this day arrived in Shanghai in command of the expeditionary forces and charged with
duties of according protection to the Japanese
residents in and about Shanghai, in cooperation
with the Imperial Navy.
"Japan's solicitous efforts to make an amicable
settlement of things has met with no success.
Since our Ninth Division was called forth for armed
operations, the Chinese have been increasing their
military preparations, leaving no doubt as to their
determination on armed action. Our Empire under
the circumstances is compelled to make such an
increase in its expeditionary forces as necessary
for the attainment of its original objects. However,
being without hostile designs and solicitous to
avoid any unnecessary complications, our army is
ready to suspend hostilities at any time, if the
Chinese withdraw their army, in compliance with
our request.
" As for the civil population of China, we shall
show them due regards as our friendly neighbours.
Regarding the nationals of other Powers, we shall,
needless to say, remain in friendly harmony with
them, showing full respect for their rights and
interests.
"Upon my arrival in Chinese territory in
command of the Imperial army, I declare, in pursuance
of our present object, my intention that our warlike
operations will be confined within the least
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possible area, with always in view an early restoration of orderly conditions, so as to ensure the
safety of our nationals and restoration of peace in
the Far East.
General Yoshinori Shirakawa,
Commander of the Expeditionary
Army to Shanghai
March 1, 1932.

VI. Operations in Liuho, Tachangchen
and Thereabout
(See Chart Ill)
Positions of the Chinese Armies Prior to Adion
The Chinese troops were generally disposed as
shown in Chart II, except the 60th and 61st
Divisions which Tsai Ting·kai had concentrated
near Tachangchen, evidently determined to hold
the second line there at all costs. At the first line
in the area of Chapei a great number of volunteers
had been placed, while the 89th Division had been
distributed in the rear toward Chiating and
Nanhsiang.
The Nineteenth Route Army had originally been
full of spirit, with fairly good fighting capacity.
When, however, the number of casualties steadily
mounted they became more and more demoralized.
Soldiers of the Guard Divisions who had had but
little experience in actual warface were heavily
punished by our fire from the first hour of their
appearance at the front. The damage was so heavy
(A)

27 that these men were soon to lose their fighting
spirit. Besides, their clash with the " shock troops
in the rear" from the Nineteenth Route Army at
Erhshihsanyuan on February 25 caused a fatal
discord between the leaders of these two armies.
The attitude of the Nineteenth Route Army men
parading themselves as the only laurel·winners in
the fight were also the cause of an eventual collapse
of their solidarity. Besides, the Chinese soldiers
took after February 28 to looting and plundering in
the neighbourhood of their quartering places. At
Tachangchen and Woosungchen the whole villages
seemed to have been sacked.
What with the pressure given by our army and
internal discords and trouble, the Chinese, when
informed of our reinforcements, felt that further
fighting would be futile. The Chief of Staff of the
Nineteenth Route Army and Wellington Koo notified
us on February 28 through the British Naval Com·
mand that, "if the Japanese would withdraw within
the International Settlement the Chinese army was
ready to evacuate beyond 20 kilometres." The same
day Wu Tieh·cheng, the Mayor of Shanghai, like·
wise had a message of a similar purport conveyed
to us by Yin Chao-chen. The Chinese first line
nevertheless went on fighting, showing no signs of
withdrawal.
On February 29 Wang Chin-wei (Wang Chao·
ming) sent us a messenger bearing a proposal for
withdrawal of both armies, who, however, emphatically stated that "the voluntary evacuation of the
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Chinese troops as stated by Wellington Koo would
never accord with the will of the people. The
Nationalist Government would consider nothing
short of the evacuation of both armies on terms of
equality."

Fighting on March 1
The Ninth Division, including the 24th Mixed
Brigade, and reinforced with three infantry battalions
from the Eleventh Division landed the previous day,
resumed action early this morning. Placing the
fresh troops between its two regiments, the Division
directed its attack on the line between Miaohsiang
and ·Kiangwan. The situation generally turning
favourably, our men captured the enemy's positions
about 4 kilometres in front and 2 kilometres in
depth. At the close of the day our first line was
advanced to the line of Miaohsiangchen, Tienyuan,
Ssuchetou and southwards. In course of these
engagements, Colonel Hayashi, commander of the
Seventh Infantry Regiment, was killed in action about
1 p.m., while assaulting a point to the west of
Kiangwanchen.
On the same night the Ninth Division advanced
all along the front, reaching the line of Paoyuhsiang,
500 metres northwest of Miaohsiangchen ; Huchiawan, to the west of Miaohsiang ; Tahsingchiao;
Maochiahsiang ; Yangchiachai, 3 kilometres to the
southwest of Kiangwanchen.
The main body of the Eleventh Division, receiving a close cooperation from the Navy, began to
(B)
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make a landing at 6 a.m. on March 1 in the face
of the enemy's machine guns. The hostile force in
this region consisted of about one battalion. The
landing place was guarded by a Chinese force,
about 100 strong and equipped with 3 machine guns.
However, our troops were completely landed during
the forenoon with no more casualties than one
engineer officer and private killed. These forces
started their southward march after noon to come
at 1 p.m. to a clash with the enemy at Chienchingying which was taken at 5 p.m.
The destruction by our navy of the Woosung
fortress at the mouth of the Whangpoo gave material
help to the transportation of our military forces.
When the Twenty-Second Regiment of Infantry and a
small force to fill up the Twenty-fourth Mixed Brigade
were landed at Woosung, the Chinese were misled
to think that the main body of our reinforcements
was first to be concentrated at this point, and their
attention was consequently diverted in these directions. When, therefore, a portion of the Eleventh
Division was landed up the Yangtze, the Chinese
forces were given a surprise, and turned in rout.
The region selected for the above landing was
swept by a violent northwesterly wind during the
night. Rough waters gave promise of difficulties of
landing. But just before the time set for the landing
the wind turned to the south, a dead calm settling
over the Yangtze water. Under these favourable
conditions and with a perfect aid of the Navy, our
military forces were able to effect such a successful
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landing in the face of the enemy as has seldom been
recorded in the military annals of the world.

Fihgting on March 2
The Ninth Division resumed action early this
morning, and advanced to a line north to south of
Tachangchen. The enemy retreated in a rout all
along the front. Making unbroken pursuit, the
Ninth Division advanced at 4.30 p.m. to the line of
W anchai, 3 kilometres north west of Tachangchen ;
Laojenliu, about 2 kilometres west of Tachangchen;
Chunghsiang, about 1 kilometre south of the same
town; Sanchili, to the south of the same; Wangchiachai, about 2 kilometres west of the Chenju
Rpilway station. Later toward sunset our first-line
forces advanced as far as Hsiaonanhsiang, about
1,500 metres northeast of Nanhsiang and Chenju.
Our landing force in Chapei also swung into
pursuit of the enemy.
The main force of the Eleventh Division, starting
from near Chienching early in the morning, advanced
on Liuhochen which was taken by 4.30 p m. It then
went on in pursuit of the enemy toward Chiating.
Throughout these engagements, the air forces of
our Army and Navy operated in full and effective
cooperation with the troops on land, assailing the
enemy in retreat at many points, and carrying out
their destructive work to the full.
(C)

Fighting on March 3
The Ninth Division this day reformed its ranks
by concentrating its main portion at Nanhsiang,
(D)
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and a portion at Chenju. The Eleventh Division
turned in the afternoon on the enemy at Chiating
from two sides, directing its main force forward
from the direction of Loutang, and another portion,
which had been landed south of Woosung, from the
direction of Nanhsiang. These troops took the same
town at 5.30 p.m.
Early this morning men of our ]anding party,
supported by an infantry force, effected a ]anding in
front of the Woosung fortress and took it by
assault.
In the afternoon of March 5 the Commander of
the Expeditionary Army issued an order to his
troops to suspend action so long as the Chinese
should refrain from hostilities, and to remain in the
present positions.

The Statement by General Shirakawa

"The Imperial Army, in concert with the Imperial nava] forces, made every effort to discharge
the duties of protecting the Japanese nationals
through pacific measures. Our ardent desire,
however, was frustrated by the Chinese Nineteenth
Route Army, which led to hostilities.
" Now the Chinese troops have withdrawn to
the distance originally demanded by the Japanese
army, with the consequence that safety of the
Japanese residents has been insured and peace restored in the Settlement.
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" I hereby declare that so long as the Chinese
troops do not resume provocative operations the
Imperial army will suspend all armed action."

VII After Cessation of Hostilities
The Japanese Army
On March 4 our troops were generally reformed
on the line of Chiliaokou, Chiating, Nanhsiang and
Chenju. The Eleventh Division advanced a part of
its men to Hakkon, 10 kilometres to the northwest
of Chiating, while a force from the Ninth Division
was sent forth to Huangtu, 10 kilometres west of
Nanhsiang, each for the purpose of keeping guard.
On this day a section of our forces took possession of the Lion Hill Forts.
From the outbreak of hostilities to March 17
the casualties of the Japanese Army were as follows:
(A)

Killed

Wounded

Total

9th Division

503

1,274

1,777

24th Mixed Brigade

151

417

568

lith Division

64

96

160

Others

-

1

1

718

1,788

2,506

Total
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Compared with what was experienced in the
European war where armies assailing strongly
fortified positions generally suffered a loss of 50
per cent of their numbers, our damage was remarkably smalL While a large measure of credit is due
to the good work of the Ninth Division and 24th
Mixed Brigade, the landing of the Eleventh Division
up the Yangtze, as a restraining movement, had
good effects upon the decision of the day.

The Chinese Army
The Chinese army seems to have withdrawn its
main force toward Soochow, and a section toward
Sungkiang, having suffered very heavy damage. It
is reported that the number of their casualties since
the outset, together with those who are missing,
amounted to about 40,000. Small forces are still to
be found at places near Taitsang and Kunshan, but
there is no longer a single force of any considerable
strength east of Soochow.
(B)

Conditions in Shanghai
In the Settlement of Shanghai the news of our
victory and the subsequent statement by the Commander of the Expeditionary Army were received
with great rejoicings by our nationals. On March 4 the
Japanese shops in Hongkew were all opened. The
whole male population voluntarily offered their services to assist in the work in the rear. Most of
the Chinese shops in the Settlement were also
opened. The refugees in the direction of Yangshupu,
(C)
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(D)
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by the Japanese, began to return to their
Our army further addressed an assuring
to these inhabitants, advising them to return
peaceful pursuits.

Chinese Propaganda

The Chinese press throughout the country had
been filled with information of malicious and often
ridiculously absurd characters. Chinese recoveries
of Liuho, Nanhsiang and Chenju; complete annihila·
tion of the Japanese army; repatriation of the routed
Japanese troops; death of General Shirakawa and
consequent hoisting of the national flag at half mast
at the consulate ; sinking of two Japanese warshipsthese are representative of the type of news printed in
the Chinese newspapers. By propagating such misinformation the Kuomintang hoped to cover the
reverses their army had been meeting with on the
field of battle. They represented the retreats of
their military forces as voluntary movements made
necessary through the menaces on the flank, failure
of the reinforcements to arrive, inferiority in military
equipment and numerical strength, and all sorts of
imaginable reasons.
The public was so misled in some instances
that they fired off firecrackers in celebration of an
imagined military success of their soldiers. It may
also be of some interest to see, for instance, what
would be the Japanese casualties according to the
Chinese reports given out from the end of January
to March 3. By adding up these figures we see
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that Japan is represented to have lost 33,470 men, 29
aeroplanes, 6 warships and 15 tanks or armoured
cars.
The common people, kept in ignorance, still
seem to believe in such versions of Chinese military
successes. In fact, most Chinese seem more favourably disposed toward the Nineteenth Route Army
than the Nanking Government which, through the
machinations of the Cantonese political influence,
was incapacitated to render adequate support to
the Nineteenth Route Army in hours of need. The
movement against the Kuomintang still remains
under the surface.

VIII. Expeditionary Forces Reduced
In view of a steady restoration of peace and
order in and about Shanghai, the Imperial Government issued on March 14 an order recalling home
the Eleventh Division, 24th Mixed Brigade and
certain special forces.
On the same occasion our military authorities
expressed themselves to the following effect :
" As set forth clearly when our military forces
were sent to Shanghai, our object in exercising our
right of self·protection was first to safeguard the
lives and property of our nationals ...there, and
secondly to restore peace and order in the International Settlement in cooperation with the other
Powers. In order to attain these objects, the commanders of our armed forces there tried all in their
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power to confine the disturbances to narrow areas
and settle them by amicable means. But the Chinese
were not only totally lacking in sincerity but even
assumed the offensive against us, causing, much to
our regret, bloodshed and slaughter. But due to
the august virtue of our Generalissimo and the
gallant performance of duties by our troops and the
effective cooperation of our navy, we have achieved
a glorious victory over the Chinese, inflicting decisive
damage upon them. The situation having thus been
securely established, we are now able to withdraw
a part of our expeditionary forces.
"However, the general situation there is still
fraught with serious eventualities. Military bands
still remain at places, and plain-clothes soldiers are
still engaged in secret activities of various sorts, so
that careful vigilance is required. The situation in
such circumstances is far from reassuring. There
are also probabilities, if current rumours be true,
that the Chinese military authorities, with an eye
to strengthening their positions both internally and
externally, may after all decide upon a continuation
of the anti-Japanese agitation or upon instigating
their people again into armed action with slogans
of recovering their lost territory."
Incidentally, our military authorities stated at
the same time that rumours that our troops had
been despatched to Formosa in connection with the
Shanghai trouble were utterly groundless.
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IX. Conclusion
Our military expedition, after a series of successful
operations, has accomplished its primary object. The
comparatively slow progress seen in the earlier
stages of the fighting was largely to be accounted
for by the impediment caused by the topographical
difficulties of those regions, offering favourable
condition for defence and proportionately bad conditions for offence. There was also too great a
difference in the numerical strength of the two
opposing armies. Our action then was planned so
as to keep our casualties as low as possible.
Our men throughout showed superb and resolute
courage in meeting all situations. In addition to
the fightings continued practically day and night,
our men had to experience considerable hardships
through lack of drinking water, poor supply of food
through absence of hands to transport, annoyances
caused by plain-clothes soldiers, and difficulties of
keeping communication with the rear.
It must also be noted that the present Shanghai
incident stood against a background of inglorious
strifes among the militarist politicians of China.
The plan for causing disturbances in Shanghai was
really conceived when the Cantonese were ousted
in their struggle with Chiang Kai-shek. Schemes had
subsquently been elaborated. It was the idea
of these men to instigate the Nineteenth Route
Army into action to the very end of complicating
the situation, hoping thereby to place Chiang Kai-
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shek in a political impasse and thus to acquire for
themselves the ruling power of the whole country.
These men purposedly propagated misinformation
as to the strength of our army so as to inspire their
soldiers and others with proper courage and antagonism. However, even with military forces far
superior in number, the Chinese were forced to
suffer heavy damage and lose ground in every encounter. They are now at pains to shove the
responsibility for each military failure to anyone
but themselves.
Under the circumstances the
political situation in China is pregnant with uncertainties and far from settled.
Nor can we be blind to the efforts the Chinese
are now making to draw the League of Nations
Powers into the Shanghai imbroglio, apparently
intent upon following their traditional policy of
playing one Power against another.
But no matter however the military situation
in China may change and however her political
conditions may be aggravated, our army will follow
its unchanged line, as set forth in the statements
of the Imperial Government. Needless to say, it
shall never be our purpose to acquire new interests
or extend them by armed force, or harbour territorial
designs. Our action will strictly be confined to the
exercise of the inviolable rights of national selfprotection, as may be seen from the statement our
commander made at the first opportunity, ordering
a cessation of hostilities,-a point which is no doubt
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clear not only to the Chinese nation but to other
friendly peoples as well.
What seems certain about this present question
of Shanghai is that the settlement of the situation
is not to be hoped for unless the National Govern·
ment of China show good faith in extirpating the
anti·Japanese education and likewise all agitation
against Japan, awakening fully to the necessity of
Sino-Japanese friendship. It is our earnest prayer
that sanity will soon come to rule over China
that she may see a peaceful and orderly state of
affairs throughout her land.
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CORRECTIONS
Please note the following corrections in "Fightings
Around Shanghai" (the Herald of Asia Library of Contemporary History, No. 8):
1. On page 2, paragraph 1, line 8, "kilometres" should

read " metres ".
2. On page 27, paragraph 1, line 8, "were" should read
"was''.
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